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It is not surprising that the example of Central
Europe is in the foreground when we are talking about
the problem of European security as a whole. How can
stability be secured in this region when one bears in mind
that no regional international organisation which could
act as the focal point for peace and security exists.
Neither are there one or two larger regional powers which
could secure this goal in cooperation with other, smaller
states.
Moreover, the transition from communism, with
its rigid economic system, to democracy and a free-
market economy obviously increases the instability
considerably. It is, therefore, only natural and legitimate
that the countries of Central Europe, in order to escape
this state ofinsecurity, try everything to quickly achieve
membership of NATO. The aggression against Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina has reinforced that attitude
among many citizens of those countries.
Recent remarks, by leading Russian statesmen
suggest aspirations to Russian hegemony, thereby further
increasing this sense of instability. Thus, Boris Yeltsin,
in a press-conference held on 8 September 1995, claimed
that "those who insist on the enlargement of NATO are
making a big mistake. This could fan the flames of war
in the whole of Europe" . In a similar vein, Sergej Krylov,
the Russian deputy foreign minister, warned, in an
interview he gave to the Latvian daily Diena on 4
September 1995, that NATO membership of
neighbouring countries would lead "not only to economic
and political, but also to military measures" by Russia,
in response to NATO air strikes in Bosnia the Russian
defence minister Pavel Grachev has recently threatened
to review his country's attitude towards international
arms treates, and the Russian Foreign Ministry has stated
that the use of Tomahawk cruise missiles in Bosnia was
"unacceptable".
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A region's security is not exclusively the result
of the military balance of power, it depends in equal
measure on the vial factors of political, social and
economic cohesion and stability.
The three important sources of instability
mentioned above should be considered in more detail:
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a) Legacies of the past
After the events of] 989 it seemed only too natural
that the peoples who had, until then, been subjected to
the oppressive and corrupt rule of communism, and had
to ensure the abject poverty engendered by its disastrous
and fundamentally misguided economic system, expected
a swift transition to full democracy and a western
standard ofliving.As we all know, this proved to be the
delusion more sober minds had foreseen. On the contrary,
instead of improving the situation of ordinary people,
the transition initially had the opposite effect. Completely
uncompetitive industries, largely unproductive sectors
of the state-run economy, and the dismal state of public
finances necessitated drastic economic and fiscal
measures. These, in turn, led to a lowering of the already
poor standard of living, which seems to be one of the
more lasting achievements of the socialist experiment.
To take just one example, the per capita income in
Czechoslovakia in ] 946 was twice as high as the relevant
Aus trian figure at the tirne, in 1990. After more than 40
years of communist rule, that ratio had been reversed.
Improving this situation is, of course, an arduous and
painful struggle requiring much patience.A rare quality
in humans at the best of'tirnes, patience is psychologically
almost impossible to achieve under the dire
circumstances prevalent in most postcommunist societies.
It is, therefore, hardly surprising when people start
blaming the reforms for their plight. This loss of
confidence leads to a decreasing attractiveness of the
democratic process and the principles of a free-market
economy. Under these circumstances it is only too easy
to fall for the siren calls of new leaders, among them
nationalists and only superficially reformed former
communists, with their invocations of a supposedly better
past, their false promises of an easy and painless cure
for all present ills and their messianic claims of a future
free from the "evils" of western-style capitalism and
painful efforts.
Moreover, the difficulties involved in establishing
a new democratic culture supported by the people and
based on a new socio-economic order are aggravated by
the fact that the responsibility of the system of real
socialism (as communism was described in recent years)
for the missed opportunities of millions of gifted people
has never been adequatly emphasized by centre and right-
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of-centre parties. This has made it possible to blame the
current state of affairs on the incumbant new democratic
reformist governments, rather than on the true culprits.
The hard task of creating a stable market economy
has encouraged representatives of the former communist
regimes to become more confident and aggressive. There
are many examples of this kind of assertiveness. The
Czech communist party, for instance, lodged a complaint
with the Council of Europe in connection with
investigations into the accumulation of capital by the
communist party during its reign. Another instructive
example is the case of the former East German
communist prime minister Modrow, who described his
conviction by an independent court for election fraud as
"Siegerjustiz" (victor'sjustice). Many of those actively
involved in suppressing and betraying their own people
and ordering shots to be fired at peaceful demonstrators,
can now be found in positions of power again. How
would one react if the convictions of representatives of
the criminal Nazi regime, for instance at the Nurnburg
trials, were to be dismissed as victor's justice?
The political and economic difficulties outlined
above are bound to cause further instability in the future
(although the degree may vary from country to country)
and impede swift progress towards normalization.
b) The problem of Russia
Russia is still a great power, its stability is,
therefore, sti IIof critical importance to European stabi Iity
as a whole. In view of the disappointing progress of
transition, many Russians have started to look back
nostalgically to the "great days" of the Soviet Union.
The appeal of extreme right-wing and of extreme left-
wing parties has grown considerably during the past few
years. The rise ofZhirinovsky is a case in point. That is
why support for the democratic forces in Russia is more
important than ever, although the inherent risk offailure
should not be underestimated.
c) The Balkan war, and the EU
as a model for stability
It would be wrong, however, to view the problem
under discussion from a purely pessimistic perspective.
The phi losophy that found its expression in the founding
of the European Union, and the principles enshrined in
the Treaty of Rome, are also the key to lasting peace
and stability in Central Europe. From the very beginning
the most important aim of European Union has been to
secure peace among the states involved in the process of
European integration. In this respect the European Union
has undoubtedly proved a spectacular success. Never
before in the history has Europe witnessed such a
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prolonged period of peace and stability comparable to
the one now existing between the member states of the
European Union. The European Union is the only
realistic long-term hope for a Europe free from war.
The tragedy of the conflict in the Balkans has
demonstrated that the United Nations and the OSCE
cannot, at present, be viewed as viable alternatives for
the preservation of peace. Where collective security falls,
self-defence - a right enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations - is the only remaining option. The desire
for an effective system of collective security, shared by
all reasonable people, has led some to view national self-
defence as morally questionable, even when the futility
of all other attempts at solving the problem has become
blatantly apparent. It is, however, even more morally
questionable when not only the aggressor but also certain
faint-hearted or ignorant politicians fall to distinguish
between the perpetrator and the victim of aggression.
When opinions such as "thank God the international
community is not seeking a military solution in the
Balkans", or the notion that every nation, given the
choice, would under all circumstances object to
participating in military action, are expressed, one is
forced to question whether any lessons from the 1930s
have been learned. How could such an attitude ever have
replied Hitler's aggression? Given such a standard of
values, how could Nazi Germany ever have been
defeated? After having exhausted all political and
diplomatic measures in a desperate, though ultimately
futile effort to secure peace, the war-generation chose
the military solution as the only remaining possibility of
liberating Europe from the insanity and the horrors of
National Socialism. It would be interesting to know, how
the younger generation, so often critical of the war-
generation, would have answered these vital questions.
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Lasting peace and stability in Central Europe
depend on a successful transition to democracy and a
free-market economy. It is, therefore, vital that all
possible support be given to this reform process, as well
as to an efficient military defence against aggression
according to Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter, which
clearly underlines the right to self-defence of every
sovereign state which is a member of the United Nations.
The Balkan crisis shows, yet again, the need for an
effective system of collective security in Europe, that
takes into account not only military but also political,
social and economic factors - a precondition for peace
and stability as the successful example of the European
Union so clearly demonstrates. We ignore this lesson at
our peril. •
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